A referendum that puts trust in Italy’s justice system at the centre of the debate.
Italy will soon vote on a constitutional reform of the judiciary, yet if you ask most voters what the referendum is actually about, the answers are often vague. The proposal backed by the government of Giorgia Meloni focuses on separating the careers of judges and prosecutors and restructuring the bodies that govern the magistracy.
But beneath the technical language of constitutional reform lies a deeper concern about the nature of institutional trust in Italy.
On the surface, the proposal appears administrative. Supporters argue that separating the careers of judges and prosecutors would clarify roles and reduce the influence of internal factions within the judiciary. Italy’s magistracy has long been organised as a single professional order in which judges and prosecutors belong to the same career structure and share the same governing council. Critics say this system has allowed entrenched internal groups, known as correnti, to shape promotions and decision-making within the judiciary.
From this perspective, reform is presented as a modernisation effort. By separating career paths and introducing changes to the governance of the judiciary, proponents argue that the system would become more transparent and less dominated by internal power blocs. The claim is that such reforms would make the justice system clearer, more accountable, and ultimately more understandable to the public.
Opponents, however, see the proposal very differently. For them, the unified structure of the magistracy is not a flaw but a safeguard. The fact that judges and prosecutors belong to the same professional order has historically been viewed as a protective barrier between the justice system and political power. The concern is that separating careers could, over time, make prosecutors more vulnerable to political influence.
These critics argue that institutional design is not just about efficiency or clarity; it is about power. Once structural changes are made to the balance between political institutions and the judiciary, the consequences may unfold slowly over decades. The question therefore becomes less about the intentions of any particular government and more about how the system might function in the future.
What makes the debate particularly Italian is that both sides claim to defend the same principle: judicial independence. Supporters of the reform say it will free the judiciary from internal factionalism. Opponents argue it could weaken the judiciary’s independence from politics.
In the end, the referendum highlights a broader dilemma facing many democracies today. Institutions that are essential to the functioning of the state are often also the ones that citizens trust the least. Reforming them is therefore both necessary and deeply contentious.
For voters, the choice is not simply between change and stability. It is between two competing visions of how to preserve trust in the system itself. And in Italy, where the tension between politics and the courts has long been part of the country’s democratic story, that is no small question.
